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ABSTRACT 
By using Interactive computer graphics (ICG) It Is 
possible to dIscuss the numerical aspects of some arms 
race Issues with more specificity and In a visual way. 
The number of variables Involved In these Issues can be 
quite large; computers operated In the InteractIve, 
graphical mode, can allow exploration of the variables, 
leadIng to a greater understanding of the Issues. This 
paper will examine some examples of Interactive computer 
graphics: (1) the relationshIp between silo hardenIng and 
the accuracy, ylel d, and reliability of ICBMs; (2) target 
vul nerability (MInuteman, Dense Pack); (3) counterforce 
vs. countervalue weapons; (4) civil defense; (5) gravIt­
ational bias error; (6) MIRV; (7) national VUlnerability 
to a preemptive first strIke; (8) radioactIve fallout; 
(9) digItal Image processIng with charge-coupled devices. 
I. I NTRODUCT I ON 
I.A. Methodologies: Words, EquatIons, Pictures, 
and ICG. In spIte of the fact that so much has already 
been written about the arms race, some general confusion 
about the strategic Importance of various mIssile systems 
and strategies continues. ThIs paper explores the 
possibility of using the vIsual medium through 
Interactive computer graphics (ICG) to learn about the 
arms race. ICG has three distinct advantages: (1) 
Interactive, vIsual educatIon; (2) debating polley; and 
(3) "networking" Information. 
We often have been told that "a picture Is worth a 
thousand words;" the Interactive pictures of leG may be 
an Improved medium for Increasing our understanding of 
the arms race. The computer can relate both to our 
logIcal, mathematical: left sIde of the brain as well as 
to the more IntuItive rIght side of the brain as has been 
IndIcated by Sperryl and others. Gradel and McGII1 2 have 
pointed out that "The graphical presentation of the 
results of complex computer model calculations Is 
frequently as Important as the computation, since It Is 
generally through such presentatIons that the modeler and 
the modeler's aUdience derive the maxImum amount of 
Information." Since the deluge of words tn our socIety 
has. weakened the strength of verbal communIcation, 
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numbers have often taken on a greater political power 
than they deserve, both because they appear to be more 
reliable, and because they are not understood. ICG can 
correct th I s tendency by a I low I ng both s' des to exp lore 
and understand the variation In the data sets that are 
used to prove the "bottom lIne." Thus, ICG can be used 
both for educating and for debating national security 
polley. Of course, there Is a limit to what can be 
quantIfied In these debates since the uncertaintIes of 
the arms race are larger than the certainties; 
nevertheless, we should try to be as accessible and 
accurate as possible when we do quantify. Lastly, ICG 
diskettes can be copied and maIled easily to those who 
wish to study and teach numerIcal aspects of the arms 
race; this ability to "network" Information adds a new 
dimension to printed words and equations. 
In this paper we will consider some sImplIfied 
models of "war games" that can be used In Interactive 
computer graphics. Most of these results can be obtained 
as easily with mathematical equatIons alone; but our 
purpose Is to enhance the transfer of knowledge to those 
who are uncomfortable wIth the use of equations. In our 
ICG program "First Strike" (Sec. VI) we will use ninety 
adjustable parameters; only with ICG can one keep track 
of this plethora of parameters which seem to become 
further removed from reality the more we "talk" about 
them. Ultimately one can not use equatIons and 
parameters alone to describe the "action-reaction" 
esca Iat Ion of the arms race and the degree of stab I I I ty 
from mutually assured destruction (MAD), but these 
mathematIcal models do set some limits on what actually 
could 
Into 
be 
the 
done, and 
Interactions 
they do give some meaningful 
that effect the outcomes 
Insights 
of these 
difficult Issues. 
I.B. Graphics. Computer graphics Involves a number 
of trIcks of the trade: the abIlity to "page-flip" 
between the two pages of high-resolutIon graphics; the 
use of toggle switches to Input data to the computer; the 
abilIty to rapidly scale and rotate shape tables ~or 
animation; the use of "Easy Draw" to prepare large 
figures such as maps; the scaling and transformation of 
Images; the use of light pens, Joy sticks, graphics 
Tablets, and graphics printers; and other processes. An 
exce I Ient text on, these graph I cs techn Iq ues has been been 
written by R. Myers 3 ; those who would like to learn more 
about these topics can purchase a diskette with about 70 
graphics programs that accompany the text. It Is 
Interesting to point out that undergraduate students are 
often more creative and faster with developIng 
sophisticated graphics than many faculty; perhaps, this 
Is because learnIng to use such terminology as peek and 
poke are very much I Ike learnIng a new foreign language. 
At any rate, perserverance can overcome most graphics 
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problems. Some of these graphics tricks are highlighted 
In the manual on. ICG which Is avai lable to accompany our 
diskette (Sec. XI). 
To demonstrate the power of interactive computer 
graphics, we will exa.mine the following Issues In the 
sections listed below: (II-IV) Target VUlnerability: 
The tradeoff between accuracy, yield, hardness, 
reliabilIty, and grav rtatlonal bias error; Minuteman 
vulnerabilIty; first and second strike weapons; Dense 
Pack MX; and civil defense. (V) Multiple Independently 
Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). (VI) Natronal 
vulnerability to a preemptive first strike; Is rt 
possible? (VII) Distribution of radIoactive fallout 
after a nuclear attack. (VIII) Digital Image processing 
to enhance verIfIcation; the use of charge-coupled device 
cameras that can be used directly wIth computers. 
II. TARGET VLlLNERAB IL ITY 
We shall begin by considering In detail an example 
that can be discussed with equations or leG; the example 
Is the case of an attack on the U.S. MInuteman force by 
SovIet SS-18 mIssiles. Sec. II will consIder some 
equatlons, Sec. III will consider ICG, and Sec. IV will 
broaden the discussion to Include the effects of a 
possible gravitational bias error. 
I I. A. Parameters. I f the accuracy of a miss I I e Is 
Increased, It follows that the yield necessary to carry 
out a mission against a hardened mIlitary target can be 
correspondingly reduced. As accuracy Increased by a 
factor of twenty tram about 5 mIles In 1954 to 1/4 mr Ie 
In 1970, the U.S. decreased the yield of Its warheads by 
a factor of about 100 from 9 megatons (Mt) for the Titan 
ICBM to 50 kilotons (kt) for Polaris/Poseidon and 170 kt 
for Minuteman. Increased accuracy was the necessary 
precursor to the deployment of smaller warheads used with 
Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) 
for counterforce purposes. The new technologies 
available to the cruise missile have further Increased 
accuracy to I ess than 10m. The tradeoff between 
accuracy and y I e I d (for hardened targets) can be 
qualitatively understood by considering the empirIcal 
relatlonshlp4 for blast over-pressure derIved from 
nuclear testing (surface blasts): 
(1) 
where p Is the overpressure In psI, Y Is the yield In Mt, 
and r Is the dIstance In nautical miles (1 nm = 1852 m). 
For the case of a "51 la-bustIng" attack on Minuteman 
where high pressures are needed, one need consider only 
the fIrst term r n Eq. 1. S I nee accuracy Improved by a 
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factor of 20 from 1954 to 1970, It follows that the yield 
could have been reduced by a factor of (20)3 = 8000 In 
order to carry out the same mII I tary miss Ion. S I nee the 
yIeld was reduced by a factor of only lOa, the additional 
effective yield of Minuteman and Polaris/PoseIdon can be 
used to overcome hardened mlssl Ie sites and to Increase 
the probabilIty of a successful mission. The 
mIniaturIzatIon of nuclear weapons has also enhanced the 
relative ability to destroy surface area (as well as 
point targets) sInce the total destructive area (s 
Increased (per Mt) wIth a Iarger number of sma I Ier 
weapons. 
II.B Minuteman VUlnerabIlity. In order to give 
some fee I I ng for the numbers Invo I ved In MInuteman 
vulnerability, let us calculateS the single shot kIll 
probabilIty (SSKP P .) for a missile attacking akhardened sIlo: 
P = 1 - e-(Y2/3/B CEp2 H213 ) (2)
k 
where B:: 0.22 when Y Is In Mt, H Is the sIlo hardne.ss In 
psi, and CEP (circular error probable) Is the accuracy In 
nm. We can determine the SSKP of destroyIng a Minuteman 
sIlo assumIng the following parametersS - 8 : (1) Minuteman 
s II os are hardened to about H = 2000 ps I; (2) The Russ Ian 
55-18 warheads typIcally have a yield Y :: 0.75 Mt and a 
CEP 280 m (0.15 nm, at some point In the future); and 
(3) The reliabIlity of an SS-18 Is, perhaps, R = 0.8. 
UsIng these parameters, the SSKP for the S5-18 on a 
MInuteman 5110 Is Pk :: 1 - e-1.0S = 1 - 0.35 = 0.65. The 5SKP should be multiplied by the rei labIlity of the 55-18 
to obtain the success rate for each 55-18 warhead; we 
obtaIn 52% for R :: 0.8, and 59% for R :: 0.9. For the 
case of aiming two 5S-18 reentry vehIcles from dIfferent 
launchers at a given 5110, the kill probability Is Pk2 
1 (0.48)2:: 77% for R = 0.8 and 83% for R :: 0.9. 
Because one Incoming warhead can destroy another Incoming 
warhead (the fratrIcIde effect), the two Incoming 
warheads must arrive less than about 10 seconds from each 
other. For thIs reason we do not have to consider the 
case of three or more Incoming warheads; nevertheless, 
for the case of 3 Independent 55-18's, the success rate 
would be Pk3 = 1 - (0.48)3 = 89% for R :: 0.8. Since 
there are 1000 Minuteman mIssiles, these results Imply 
that, perhaps, 170 to 230 would survive two 55-18's, and 
100 would survive 3 5S-18's. The latter case would 
consume the entire 5S-18 force since there are about 308 
5S-18 launchers and each could be MIRVed about 10 times. 
From this analysIs we can conclude that "MInuteman 
vulnerabIlity" means that the U.S. would have between 100 
to 250 MInuteman launchers (200 to 600 warheads) 
remaining after a Russian first-strike attack. These 
calculatIons consIder neIther the possIbIlity of 
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systematic bIas errors (Sec. IV) nor the other armaments 
that are avaIlable to deter such an attack (Sec. VI). 
II. C Dense Pack. I t has been proposed to base the 
MX mlssl Ie In a very closely packed matrix (545 m apart) 
so that IncomIng mlssi les would destroy each other 
(fratricide). Let us determine the mInimum value of the 
hardness (H In psi) of the MX silos that would prevent 
incoming warheads of yield Y =: 0.75,1,5, and 25 Mt from 
destroying more than one MX si 10. Since the nearest 
neighbor spacing Is 545 m, an IncomIng warhead that 
landed halfway betw.een two silos would be 273 m from each 
silo. Using the formula for overpressure from surface 
blasts (Eq. 1), we obtain the following values: H > 3500 
psi for 0.75 Mt warheads; H > 5000 psi (1 Mt); and H > 
22,000 psi (5 Mt), and H > 110,000 psi (25 Mt). In 
addition, one must consider the size of the craters from 
thesew ar heads; 1fther adius 0 f the era t e r 4, 9 I s grea t e r 
than 275 m, both silos could be destroyed. By using the 
Rand Corporation "Bomb Damage Effect Computer" (1964), 
we have obtained the radl I of the craters In rock: r ::: 
142 m (0.75 Mt), r::: 158 m (1 Mt), r::: 279 m (5 Mt), and 
r ::: 485 m (25 Mt). These crater rad! I (In rock) can be 
approximately described by r - 160 Y~3 where r Is In 
meters and Y Is In Mt. By buIldIng silos In more 
res II I ent rock med I a It is poss I b I e to reduce the effect 
of these craters somewhat, but it Is clear that a very 
large warhead would create a large enough crater to 
destroy two MX sl los. (There Is some recent evidence 
that these crater radi I for very large weapons must be 
reduced by about a factor of two.) 
J I I. TARGET VULNERABILITY WITH ICG 
III.A leG. The complexity of the equations of 
Sec. I I is usually enough to dissuade most people from 
movIng from a discussion of the trees (equations) to a 
broader dIscussion of the forest (stabIlity In the arms 
race as affected by numbers). To obtaIn a view of the 
forest we wIll use ICG to obtain a "physIcal feel" for 
the parameters and equations dealIng wIth target 
VUlnerabIlIty. We will briefly descrIbe the ICG program 
"Bombs" which has five adjustable parameters: yield (Y), 
accuracy (CEP), hardness (H), number of warheads aImed at 
a silo (U, and gravitational bias error (Sec. IV). The 
program "Bombs" assumes 100% reliability for the Incoming 
warheads; It caul d be modified with a random number 
generator to account for less than 100% reliabilIty. 
Bombs does the followIng: It calculates the kill radIus 
(rk) of a warhead as a function of the yield of the 
warhead and the hardness of the silo; It scatters circles 
wIth a radius of rk about the aim point wIth an accuracy 
of CEP usrng Gaussian statistics; It simulates 
189 
gravItatIonal bIas error by shIftIng the aIm poInt wIth a 
Joy stIck; the key "Q" can be used to cal I up the menu to 
scale the graphics and to vary Y, CEP, and H. 
The program calculates the kill radIus (In nm) of a 
surface blast as a functionS of the yIeld of the weapon 
and the hardness (H ~ P In Eq. I) of the target; 
r k = {Y/(0.068H - 0.23H
l/2 + 0.19)}1/3 • (3) 
For example, the kill radius of an SS-18 warhead (0.75 
Mt) wl( I vary dependIng on the hardness of the Intended 
target: For a Minuteman 5110 (2000 psI), rk ::: 335 m 
(0.18 nm); for superhardenlng Minuteman to H = 5000 psI 
for MX deployment, rk = 245 m (0.13 nm); for a horIzontal 
MX (600 psi), rk = 5'-0 m (0.28 nm); for cIties with H = 5 
psI, rk;:: 6.7 km (3.6 nm); and for clvll defense with H = 
30 psi, rk = 1.7 km (0.92 nm). Similarly, the kIll 
radIus will vary depending on the yIeld of the warhead 
that Is aimed at a MInuteman sIlo (H ::: 2000 psi): for Y 
::: 0.75 Mt, rk ::: 335 m (0.18 nm), for Y ::: 0.35 Mt (MX), rk 
;:: 260 m (0.14 nm); and for Y = 0.1 Mt <TrIdent), rk = 170 
m (0.093 nm). In FIgure 1, the computer graph"lcs has 
drawn the circles associated with these kIll radiI. 
The accuracy of the Incoming missIles Is 
Incorporated Into the program In the fol lowIng way: The 
program assumes that the IndIvidual mIssiles are randomly 
spread about the aIm point with a normal GaussIan 
distribution; 
(4) 
with cr = CEP/l.17. This Implies no systematic bias 
error; the dIstribution Is centered about the arm point 
at r O. The program does Its calculation on a 
rewrrtten form of Eq. 4 to obtaIn the random radius for 
this Gaussian distribution, 
rCrandom) := - (21/ 2 cr) In(Rnd) (5) 
where Rnd Is a random number between 0 ann 1 generated by 
the computer. In addItIon, the program assumes random 
angles for the missiles wIth respect to the aim poInt. 
WIth these assumptions, "Bombs" can graph the case of 
SS-18 (Y = 0.75 Mt) aimed at Minuteman sl los (H = 2000 
pst) with an accuracy of CEP 0.15 nm = 280m (In 
1985?). For the case of 100 Independent 55-18 warheads 
falling on Minuteman, "Bombs" calculates (see FIg. 2) 
that 30 missiles survive and that 70 missiles are 
destroyed. This Is statIstIcally consIstent with Eq. 2 
whIch IndIcates that 35% of the MInuteman force would 
survIve an attack of one $S-18 of 100$ reliability on one 
sIlo. In 1981 and 1983 the U.S. government has proposed 
placing the MX missile In superhardened Minuteman silos 
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FIg. 1. KILL RAD'II: The kill radius of a mIssIle Is a 
functIon of the yIeld (Y) of the missile and the hardness 
(H) of the sIlo (Eq. 3). The dots In the figure are 0.2 
nautIcal mIles (1 nm;:: 1852 m) apart, and the matrIx of 
dots is 1.6 nm (1.85 miles) on a sIde. For the case of 
the 55-18 mIssIle (y .. 0.75 Mton) the ICG program "Bombs" 
has drawn the following cIrcles: (1) H = 2000 psI for 
the MInuteman sIlo, (2) H 5000 psI for the 
superhardened MInuteman silo, (3) H = 600 psI for the 
horIzontal MX missIle, and (4) H" 30 psI for the urban 
area with clv II defense. For norma I urban areas of H ;:: 5 
psi, the kl II radIus Is offscale sInce It Is 3.6 nm (6.7 
km = 4.2 miles). For the case of the MInuteman sl los 
wIth H ;:: 2000. circles have been drawn for (1) Y = 0.75 
Mton (55-18). (5) Y;:: 0.35 Mton for the MX mIssIle, and 
(6) Y = 0.1 Mton for the TrIdent submarIne. The cIrcles 
appear e I I I pt 1ca I I n shape because of the App I e graph J cs. 
FIg. 2. HARDENED MINUTEMAN SILOS: The patfern of 
mIssiles Is dIstrIbuted about the aIm point according to 
GaussIan statIstIcs (Eq. 4). In the upper portIon of 
this figure we have consIdered the case of the 55-18 
missile (Y ;:: 0.75 Mton) with a cIrcular error probable 
accu.racy of CEP ;:: 0.15 nm (perhaps, In 1985?) on the 
MInuteman silos (H ;:: 2000 psI). In this example, 5 of 
the 7 sl los were destroyed under the assumptIon of 100% 
rei lability for the 55-18. The same parameters are used 
In the lower portIon of the fIgure (Y ;:: 0.75 Mton, CEP ;:: 
0.15 nm). but the MInuteman silos have been hardened to H 
= 5000 psi; 4 of the 7 miss! les were successful (with 
100% reliability). If the reliability of the S5-18 had 
been 85%, only 6 of the 7 mIssiles would have landed. 
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Fig. 2 HARDENED MINUTEMAN SiLOS:(Caption on prevIous page) 
Fig. 3. U.S. COUNTER-FORCE WEAPONS: (A) The MX missile(Y 0.35 Mton, CEP = 0.05 nm) Is aimed at sf los with H =2000 psi; the smaller, but very accurate MX could be usedas a first-strike weapon. (B) The Trident I missile (V ;;;0.1 Mton) may have modest accuracy (middle of figure, Y =0.1 Mton, CEP = 0.25 nm), or ee) the Trident II may havea very good accuracy (bottom of figure; CEP = 0.1 nm).The former case of 0.25 nm could Imply a second-strikerole against urban targets (or a first strike against anairfield), while the later case of 0.1 nm could Imply afirst-strIke role against Sovl.t sIlos. 
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by I ncreas I ng H 
display In Fig. 
Improvement are 
consistent with 
5000 psi. The ICG 
consequence of thIs 
These results are 
of the SSKP which 
from 2000 ps I to 
2 shows that the 
not very great. 
the calculation 
decreases from 65% for 2000 psi to 44% for 5000 ps i for 
the case of R = 1.0. 
III.B Counter - Force Weapons. Figure 3 shows quIte 
graphIcally that the MX missile (Y = 0.35 Mt, CEP = 100 m 
= 0.05 nm, and Iet us assume H = 2000 ps I for Sov let 
silos) Is a counterforce weapon that could destroy a 
hardened target In a first-strike attack. In spIte of 
the fact that the MX has a smaller yield than the 5S-18 
<0.35 Mt/O.75 Mt ~ 50%), Its greater accuracy (0.05 
nm/0.15 nm 1/3) al lows the MX to have a consIderably 
larger SSKP (99%) than the SS-18 (65%). Figure 3 shows 
that the Trident I submarine (Y = 0.1 Mt) would not be 
used as a first-strike weapon If Its CEP = 0.25 nm 
because of Its minimal kill ability, but that (depending 
on the hardness of the target) the Trident I I could be a 
first-strike weapon If Its CEP = 0.1 nm or less. 
III.C Civil Defense. Lastly, one can examIne the 
ability of warheads to destroy cities (H = 5 psi). In 
FIgure 4 the leG plot of a "random" attack by 5S-18 
warheads Indicates that one warhead of 3/4 megaton can 
easily destroy (rk = 6.7 km) the city In the figure (3 km 
by 3 km). If a civil defense polley Is established to 
harden shelters wIth H = 30 psi, leG shows that the 
hardened urban targets are stili destroyed (rk = 1.7 km). 
The hardening of cities Is very difficult; hence the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Is 
establishing controversial evacuatIon plans for U.S. 
cIties. 
Fig. 4. CIVIL DEFENSE: TypIcal ~ buildings In urban areas have a 
hardne~s of H = 5 psi; the S5-18 (Y = 00 
0.75 Mton) can easily destroy large Y=O.75 
areas (top of figure; rk = 6.7 km; 
circles seperated for visualization 
and a scale factor of 1:10). Using 
ha r den ed, c Iv I Ide fen s e .5 he I t e r s (H = 
30 psi) doesn't effectively mitigate 
the situatIon (bottom of figure; rk = 
1.7 km; circles seperated wIth CE'P = 
1 nm and a scale factor of 1:2). 
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IV. MiSSiLE ACCURACY AND GRAVITATIONAL BIAS ERROR 
The Issue of "bIas error" In ICBM targetIng has been 
raised recentlyIO; It has been suggested that systematic 
errors from gravitational uncertaintIes may reduce the 
accuracies of US/USSR missiles so that they may not 
attarn their stated accuracies for trajectorIes over the 
po Ies. (Th Is I naccuracy Is probab Iy Iess than the 
uncertainty In the listed aIm poInt.) This reductIon In 
accuracy could result because the ICBM's would experience 
a dIfferent gravitational field for bal I Istlc 
trajectorIes over the poles (which are not tested) as 
compared to the trajectory to ~wajaleln Atol I (which Is 
often tested); the uncertainties In correcting for the 
dl fferent "g" force for the pol ar trajectory (as well as 
other gravitational shifts) might shift the "aim point" 
away from the Intended target In an undeterminable way. 
The Executive Branch has Indicated that the bras errors 
are Included In the lIsted accuracies of the ICBM's. 
However, It Is Important to consider the Issue of 
gravitational bias since It questions whether eIther sIde 
cou I d ever have conf I dence Inits ab III ty to successf uII y 
carry out a preemptIve first strike. We wIll not be able 
to determine the uncertainties caused by these bIas error 
correct Ions; however, we wII I s Imu Iate b I as error with 
leG In order to graphically describe the problems. 
In order to avoid the mathematIcal compllcatlons ll 
from an ICBM's Keplerl?!n elliptIcal trajectory, let us 
conslder 7 the trajectory of an ICBM that follows a 
parabo I Ic path above a large f Iat earth. S Inee the 
earth's polar radius of 6357 km Is 21 km (0.3%) smaller 
than Its equatorial radius of 6378km, we should expect 
different "g" values for the polar trajectory as compared 
to the trajectory to the U.S. mIssile target at KwaJaleln 
Atoll. In the normal three dimensIonal problem one would 
consider the earth to be made up of a variety of 
"mul tlpolar" shaped mass objects (hamburger shaped, 
oblate spheroidal, etc.), and then apply Newton's second 
law to a complicated force function which described this 
nonspherlcal, multipolar earth. We shall allow our 
pedagogIcal earth to be flat In order to estImate the 
uncertainty In the range 
x = v2 sln(28)/g (6) 
that Is caused by the uncertainty ~g In the dIfferent 
gravitational field of an untested trajectory. The 
uncerta r nty In the range wII I be 
~X/X = 2(~v/v) + 2(68/tan(28» - ~g/g. (7) 
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The difference In g between trajectorIes over the 
pole and along the equator can be approximately 
determined from the ratio of the mass In the bulge (6M) 
of the earth to the mass of the earth (M). For 
trajectories which stay reasonably close to the earth 
(within about 1000 mIles), we can crudely approxImate 
bg(g ~ 6M/M. Since ~R/R = 0.3% = 10- 3 , we can expect 12 
approximately that ~g/g ~ bM/M $ 10- 3 • From this we see 
that the potential uncertainty In the ICBM flight path 
from an uncorrected gravitational bias error (10- 3 ) 15 
considerably larger than the uncertaInty In the range due 
to uncertaintIes In velocity and angles which are about 
10- 5 == (0.1 km/10,000 km). Thus, It Is clear that 
grav I tatl ona I correct Ions (due to a nonspher Ica I Earth, 
local gravity anomalies, and the Earth's rotation) must 
be made for polar traJectories; the only question Is the 
degree of accuracy with whIch one must be able to perform 
these corrections in 'order to reduce the uncertaInty In 
pg(g to better than 10- 5 • Since neither the US, nor the 
USSR will be allowed to test the quality of their 
calculations with ICBM launches over the pole to the 
territory of the other side, a government would have to 
believe that their aerospace experts are capable of 
measurements and calculations with better than 1% 
accuracy In the correctIon for the 9 for~es In order to 
have any kind of confidence that a strike on land-based 
miss! Ie sl los would have any chance of success. ICG can 
be used to II Iustrate these effects; I n Figure 5 we have 
simulated a substantial gravitational bIas error by 
shiftIng the pattern of cIrcles from the aim point with 
the "joy stick" of the computer. In this figure we have 
set the magnItude of the bias error equal to 0.3 nm In 
both the x and y directions. Since the magnitude of the 
total bias error In this example Is 0.45 nm (or three 
times the CEP of 0.15 nm used In this ICG example) all of 
the mIssiles (In this fIgure) missed the target. The 
actual magnitude of the Inaccuracy In the bias error 
correction Is less than this fIgure, but ICG 
descrIptIvely Indicates how small the bias error has to 
b~ In order to neglect Its consideratIon. 
Fig. 5 GRAVITATIONAL BIAS ERROR: 
~G{G EllA!:!: ~=\,=O,3 , Corrections for dIfferent trajectorIes 
q:P=O·15 (6g/g - 10- 3 ) must be carrIed out to 
about 1% If the bias error Is not to 
~_degrade the CEP of missiles (CEP/Range.~., 10- 5 ). In Fig. 5, the aim point ofx=p.7!? ,, ..., the 58-18 (Y = 0.75 Mt, CEP == 0.15 nm,
.H=.2090 H = 2000 ps r) was moved from the s I 10 
with a very large bias error of 0.4 nm 
with the "joy stick" of the computer. 
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V. MIRV/ASW 
Inth Issect Ion we wI I I br ref Iy des c rIb e tw 0 ICG 
programs that were deve loped by Kent Norv I I Ie, a stu dent 
In my class on the arms race; these programs on MIRV and 
ASW (anti-submarIne warfare) are Intended to be 
provocatIve "teaching tools" rather than sophisticated 
"polley making tools." 
The MIRV technology Is capable of spreadIng Its 
IndIvIdual warheads over a dIstance of about 1000 km; the 
actual calculation of the ellIptIcal, ballIstIc 
trajectorIes of the reentry vehicles can be approximated 
as a shift In the range and tracking position from the 
orIgInal ballistIc trajectory. In order to sImplify the 
mathematics, the program uses the "flat earth" 
approxImation (F1g. 6) for the ballIstIc proJectl1 es; the 
program allows the user to vary the number of reentry 
vehicles, and theIr IndIvidual velocities (magnItude and 
angle) wIth respect to the bus. This approach allows 
only a varIatIon In the range dIrection, and not the 
trackl,ng directIon; nevertheless, this approach has 
assisted those students who are unfamll lar wIth MIRV to 
understand It more completely • 
.' .,' .... ,\':.~. ,.... " 
........ \ ....
km 
1000- " ":. 
", ':. 
. ' .
. . 
'" ': 
'.2'. '. 
.... ~ 
dl 
kmo 5000 10,000 
Fig. 6. MIRV: The equatIons for the "flat earth" (Sec. 
IV) are used to obtaIn the trajectories for the 
IndivIdual reentry vehIcles and the mIssIle bus. An 
InItIal velocIty of 10 4 m/s Is used for the ICBM. The 
number of reentry vehicles and their velocItIes and 
angles (In range only) can be varIed In the program. 
Momentum Is conserved In the system as the reentry 
vehIcles are released. The range, height and spread In 
range for the re-entry veh Icl es from the IIf Iat earth" 
calculations are very sImIlar to those for the actual 
"round earth." 
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The leG program "ASW" applies an ASW technology that 
determines the position of a submarine by comparing the 
time delays of signals reflected from a submarine to 
several hydrophones; more recent technologles 13 use 
sonobuovs that transmit and receIve their own sonar 
signals, Infrared observations from satellites, FourIer 
transform I ng sonar sIgna I s, Iasers, and other 
technologIes. The "ASW" program stimulates consideration 
of these more modern technologies as well as makIng clear 
the uniqueness of the ocean-going leg of the triad. 
VI. FIRST STRIKE 
The qu
continually 
estion 
being 
of vUlnerability to 
debated. The Issue 
a 
of 
first-strike Is 
"VUlnerability" 
usually means "will we have enough nucl ear weapons to 
assure destruction on those who would attack us." The 
debates on this Issue often use words I Ike "superiority, 
parity and sufficiency." In spite of the fact that the 
uncertainties In first-strike situations are likely to be 
greater than the certainties, both sides In this debate 
do use numerical data to buttress their arguments. (For 
example, It would be dIfficult to quantify the 
uncertainty In the command, control, and communications 
systems caused by the electromagnetic pulse.) 
If one chooses to answer these questions with 
numbers and equations, one soon learns that the size of 
the data base, and the complexity of the manipulations, 
reqUires a computer; It Is for this reason that we have 
developed the program "First-Strike." This program 
analyzes the strategIc balance by letting us vary 90 
adjustable parameters to explore how the many parameters 
affect the question of vul nerability. Each side (America 
= A and Russia = R) has a 6 by 6 matrix of parameters to 
describe their weapon systems. The matrix formulation Is 
merely a way of keeping track of the parameters; we do 
not use matrix algebra. Three data'sets (the present, 
the future without arms control, and the future wIth arms 
contro I) are J nc I uded with the program. Tab Ie I shows 
the A and R matrices as they approximately appear at the 
present time (1980-85): 
Table I. The A and R matrices for the present time 
(1980-85). The rows are the 6 different mlssl Ie classes 
(land, sea, air, Intermediate range ballistic missile, 
tactl ca I weapons, and cru I se miss II e). The co Iumns are 
the average values of the param~ters which describe each 
system (yield, average number of reentry vehicles per 
launcher, number. of launchers, circular error probable 
accuracy (nautical miles), reliabilIty (0-1), sIlo 
hardness (ps r». 
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AMERICAN AMATRIX (198571) RUSSIAN R MATRIX 
I=Y 2=M 3=N 4=CEP 5=R 6=H I=Y 2=M 3=N 4=CEP 5=R 6=H 
I=LANO .335 2.1 1052 ,12 .8 2000 ,75 3.2 1398 .15 .7 2000 
2=SEA .1 8 656 .25 .8 5 .5 2 950 .5 ,7 5 
3=AIR 4 346 .1 .8 3 4 156 .1 .8 3 
4= IRBM .1 1500 .1 .8 .1 4500 .1 .8 5 
5=TAC. .02 20000 .1 .8 5 .02 10000 .1 .8 
6=CM .2 1000 .01 .8 5 0 0 0 .01 0 0 
T~ls data set can be updated easily to account for 
changes In the parameters. For example, we mIght want to 
take Into account ~hat the 52 Titan ICBM's are beIng 
decommIssioned; by typing 1,3 (row,column), and 1000., we 
w11 I have changed the number of Amer I can I and-based 
mIS5 II es from 1052 to 1000. I f we are content w' th the 
data set, we would type 0,0 to accept It. One can easrly 
take Issue with the averagIng process that we have used; 
for examp Ie, we· have proper', y taken I nto account the 
MIRVing of MInuteman (II, and II') by using M = 2.1, but 
we have further assumed that they wi I' have an average 
yield comparable to the Mark 12-A warheads of 335 
kilotons. The main point of "FIrst-StrIke" Is to create 
a method of changing the parameters as one discusses (and 
updates) the data base; after the data base Is acceptable 
to the debators, the numer.Jcal operations can be carried 
out. In addition, there are other parameters whIch deal 
wIth the number of warheads sent to attack a sf 10 (l), 
gravItatIonal bias error (BE = CEP(wlth)/CEP(wlthout)), 
submarIne duty factor, effectlvness of ASW, and varIous 
other parameters. 
One can examine the one-on-one match-ups between 
varIous systems by calculatIng the single shot kl I I 
probabr r lty <P In Section") with reliabIlity (Tk ;;; R x 
Pk), and then the kIll probabIlity with L warheads (from 
separate mlsslles)'L 
Kl ;;; 1 - (1 - T ) ( 8 ) P k 
After we have examIned these InItial one-to-one results, 
"First StrIke" matches up the land-based mIssIles agaInst 
each other. In the example discussed below we have used 
2 warheads (l = 2) against each 5110. In the next 
versIon of this program, we Intend to add further 
f Iexab II It I ssG to a I low any sy stem to attack any other 
system, to allow for the attack of cIties, and to allow 
for a "launch on warnIng" situation and other operational
factors. 
We have allowed for broad uncertal ntlesln "FIrst 
StrIke" by allowing for fractIonal (0-1) parameters; for 
our "base case"we have used the followIng: 
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FSUB = submarine duty factor = 0.6 for A; 0.2 for R. 
FASW = effectiveness of ASW = 0.5 for A and R. 
FIRBM = FTACTICAL = FCRUISE = FBOMBER 
= fractions destroyed = 0.5 and 0.5 for A and R. 
It would not be difficult to show that all the parameters 
(other than FSUB) should be smaller than 0.5; thus, the 
destructiveness of the results from "First Strike" are 
actually an upper bound estimate. The number of 
surviving launchers are merely the products of the 
appropriate fractional probabIlitIes and the number of 
launchers, except for the case of an attack on the 
land-based missiles where we have used the probability 
formulation from Eq. 2 and 8. The resultant numbers of 
remaining warheads after a first strIke were obtained 
from the base case of the "present" data set and they are 
displayed In Fig. 7. We see that approximately 50% (an 
upper bound) of the first triad (land/sea/air) and the 
second triad (IRBM/tactlcaJ/crulse mlssl Ie) would be 
destroyed 14 1f either side should be tempted to carry out 
such a scenario. SInce the number of warheads surviving 
wou Id be rather Iarge, there Is st II I a large 
second-strike force to retaliate. SInce the fractional 
probabilities 
parameters on 
are 
the 
not certain; debators can change these 
next run of the program. "First 
Strike" also 
(K), and the 
keeps 
num
track 
bers of 
of the total yield, lethality 
launchers before and after. 
~~ 2 
6 7 
I I II f f I f I f 
US SU US SU 
FIRST TRIAD SECOND TRIAD 
(LAND/SEA/AIR) (IRBMITACTICAL/CRUISE MISSILE) 
Fig. 7. FIRST STRIKE: The number of US/USSR warheads 
are compared before and after a "fIrst strIke." The 
present (1980-85) data base and the parameters described 
In the text were used to obtain these results. 
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VII. FALLOUT. 
If a nuclear attack ever occurred, there would be 
radIoactive plumes extending from the target points. The 
ICG program "Fallout" calls up a map of the United States 
(Fig. 8) and al lows the user to locate the targets and 
the number of weapons used on each. Parallelograms are 
used to simulate the more complex shape~5 of the plumes;
the area of the para I Ie Iograms agree with the more 
accurately calculated affected areas by about 25%. The 
final shapes for the plumes are highly dependent on the 
wInd velocities; our ICG program allows for two dIfferent 
wInd velocItIes, 20 mph and 60 mph where the later Is 
approximately 50% of the stratospheric velocity. Two 
plumes are located at each target; the Inner plume 
represents a minimum dose of 1350 REM outside of 
buildIngs and 450 REM InsIde the bull dIng; the outer 
plume represents 450 REM outsIde and 150 REM Inside. 
These dose levels would vary consIderably within the 
plumes and within the buildings. A radiation dose of 
about 450 REM would kill about 50% of the population. 
The present version of this program does not determIne 
the number of fatalities; a future version will Include 
population densIty and a biological coupling factor In 
order to do this even though there would be great 
uncertaInties In the absolute numbers of fatalities. 
o 
1/)-
... 
Fig. 8. FALLOUT: (FIgure caption on next page.) 
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Fig. 8. FALLOUT: Four different attacks are considered 
with "Fallout;" (1) one megaton weapon (50% fission), (2) 
10 one megaton weapons, (3) 300 one megaton weapons wIth 
a wInd velocIty of 20 mph, and (4) 300 one megaton 
weapons with a wfnd velocIty of 60 mph (about 50% of 
stratospheric velocity). The Inner plume represents an 
area In which a minimum dose of 1350 REM Is receIved for 
those who are outside of buildings, and a minimum dose of 
450 REM InsIde of buIldings; the outer plume represents 
an area with a dose of 450 REM outside and 150 REM 
InsIde. The bases attacked are (1) Ellsworth 
(x=82,Y=50), (2) Malmstrom (55,28), (3) Warren (78,67), 
and (4) WhIteman (115,85). 
VIII. DIGITAL IMAGE PROCESSING. 
In order for the Senate to ratify an arms control 
agreement, It must have confidence In Its "national 
technIcal means" to verify that the various conditions of 
t~e treaty are being upheld by the other party. 
Ultimately, the Senate must decide how likely It would be 
that the other party could carry out a sIgnificant 
Infraction (In terms of national security) before we 
could discover the Infraction. One of main techniques 
for verification Is photography from spy satellites. The 
InformatIon In the photographic Images can be enhanced by 
digItIzing the Intensity at varIous regIons of a 
photograph; the dlgltlzatlon Is fol lowed by mathematIcal 
operatlons 16 on the dIgital InformatIon In order. to 
enhance the signal with respect to the background noise. 
More recently It has become possfble to directly process 
the electronic output of a charge-coupled device (CCD)17 
wIthout the necessity of using film; the CCD devIces a~e 
much more efficient than film, have a broader spectral 
range (Into the Infrared), and can be used directly wIth 
computers without reqUirIng digItizing that Is needed for 
fIlm. .In additIon the CCDs are preferable to vidIcon 
televIsIon techniques since they can have better 
resolutIon, can be operated with low voltages, and are 
more resIlient under Impact. Some commercial CCDs 
contaIn 640,000 regions (pIxels) of dIgital InformatIon; 
a p) xe I reg Ion can be about 15 mIcrons on a s I'de. CCD 
cameras are presently commercIally available (MIcron 
Techno logy, 80 I se, Idaho for about $300) that can be used 
wIth Apple computers (54,000 pixels). The techniques of 
digItal Image processing (DIP) have been used In a wide 
var Iety of ap p I Icat Ions beyond ver I f Icat Ion such as In 
astronomy, medIcine, geology, and criminology. 
On ba I ance, the "spy sate I I Ites" and DIP are thought 
to be stabl I Izlng for the arms race because they (1) 
enhance verIfIcation grvlng greater confidence to the 
SALT/START process, and (2) because more Information from 
satel lites can reduce the ten~ency towards "worst 
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possible case analysis." Some Senators objected to SALT 
II because of the loss of verification facilities In 
Iran. PresIdent Jo~nson made the comment In 1967 when he 
Indicated that the $35-40 bIllion spent on space was 
worth I t because "I know how many miss J I es the enemy 
has." 
ThIs section of our paper wIll do the followIng: 
(1) BrIefly dIscuss some' mathematical applications of 
DIP, and (2) demonstrate some Inltral results of ceo with 
Apple computers. In Fig. 9 we have created a one 
dimensIonal silo (20 pIxels wide) that Is partially 
blurred by noIse developed from a random number 
generator. When the signal-to-noise ratIo (SIN) Is very 
hr gh, one does not' need to process th e data to see the 
silo, but when the SiN ratio Is less than one It becomes 
necessary to process the Image In order to be able to 
"see" the silo. In Fig. 9, we have subtracted the Image 
from a versIon of the same Image that has been shIfted by 
1 to 20 pixels. This teChnIque allows us to examine the 
data for an auto-correlation within the data; If we 
expect the silo to be 20 pixels wide, we would look for a 
fIgure that looks lIke a square wave wIth a wavelength of 
40 pixels. In order to work with lower SiN ratios, one 
could then FourIer analyze the difference Image and look 
for FourIer components consIstent wIth the size of the 
s I' o. 
SIN -16 SIN -2 
°""···,.."..,··,,,,·"·..·'·11111111111111111111"'···'·, '""'I'"'''I''I''''''''I''I\I~IIIIIIIII'IIIIIII'''I''''' 
1 ,,,,1111,',,,1,,1,,,11,,,,,111.11',,111111,,,,,1'1,,,"1111 
5".,..".",,,,, ,,,,..11111...""""""11111"""'" 
Fig. 9. DIGITAL IMAGE 
PROCESSING: A random 
number generator Is 
10 ,."" ..""" ,lImlllll",..'''''lIIl11llll''··'·", 
15 "..,,,.,.,,.,.111111111111111"'"111111111111111''''''''' 
'1"""1.""",.•,1,,,11111,,1""""11111"'11""'"'' 
",,,.,,.. ,.,,,,,1.1111111111'1,,1'11,1111'11 
' 
,,,,,,,,,,,,, 
used to partIally mask 
a missile silo with 
SiN ratIos between 16 
20 .,,,., 111\1111''''''''' ',....1',1111.11,1111"11.111"11"'111111"1'1'11.""'.,, 
and 1/4. The 
pixels wide) 
5110(20 
can be 
SIN -1/2 
o 1"I"'I"III"'I'IIIIIIII'I'jI'I'IINII'I"'IIIII"/I"lI 
1 1,.",1"1,.".1("..1""1,.1,1",1'.,1""."",1",,,, 
5 1"·,I·I"""·",,II"I'f'Io"'IIIIII."'I"'II"I.l.I.11I 
10 ".,.,11",..,111"1.,1",1,101,,1"'''1,,,''11'''1
1'1'''" 
SIN *1/4 
1"'11/111'11'1/111"""1"1"11'/'/11"11'1'1"""1'1'" 
",1..'1"1"1"""""1"111"""",.1.",,,,,,,,,,1,... 
,h'II,··,I,.III'I..Ir""',I..\,,,,,,I,,,II'I,·,·I'I"'" 
,11"'''''''\'''1\"''',1111'''''''.''''11'1'''1,,",,,.11 
discovered with auto-
correlation technIques 
by subtracting the 
data from the original 
data after shIftIng It 
by 1 to 20 pIxels. If 
the resulting data was 
FourIer analyzed, one 
15 
20 
1I""'I'I·".I'II,I".""II""I"lI'lI'l'""",'I.,I'11 
"..II",I"I,II,IIII.II"I.I"·/'III'·"lp""'I'""II" 
,hlwl,J"I"",I""'I'li""I'I""'I·!,,·,IIII.l.t1, 
,1""11""""".,.,/,11""'11',"""11"'1,,1,11,.1,11 
wou'd obtaIn a strong 
component wIth a 40 
pixel wavelength. 
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Atn) 
SIN = 8 
~~

~~
 
Fig. 10. FOURIER TRANSFORM: The spatial data can be 
Fourier analyzed to obtain Its fequency spectruril; by 
reversing the process the spatial representation can be 
reestabl (shed. The sIlo appears more clearly when only 
the 4 lowest frequency components are used and the 46 
higher components containing the "noise" are rejected. 
SIN = 1 Aln) SIN =1/4 
Fig. 11. SiN RATIO. The approach of Fig. 10 
successfully Identifies a silo with a SiN of 1/4. Two 
dimensIonal transforms woul d use the geometry of the 5110 
to Improve the results. 
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Another approach of DIP Is to FourIer Transform the 
digital Information of the Image, remove the high 
frequency components that are assocIated with the noise, 
and then Fourier transform the remaining low frequency 
(/ong wClvelength) signal back to the spatial Image. By 
analyzing the data we convert It from a spatial 
representation to a freqency spectrum; the second Fourier 
transform then synthesizes (reconstructs) the spatial 
Image from the truncated frequency spectrum. In Fig. 10, 
we have obtained a 101 pixel array In one dimension from 
the equatIon y '" (NN)(Rnd{l» + S where NN Is the peak 
noise and S Is the Intensity of the signal. The Image In 
Fig. 10 has a favorable slgnal-to-nolse ratio of SiN = 
S/(NN/Z) = 8; when this Image Is FourIer analyzed, one 
obtains large components In the low frequency region 
which Is assocIated wIth the 5110 sIgnal, and small 
components at the hIgh frequency regl0n whIch is 
assocrated with random noise. When the Image Is 
reconstructed from these components, we observe that only 
the 4 lowest components are necessary to eas I I y detect 
the 5/10, and that a greater number of components tends 
to blurr the reconstructed Image. In Fig. 11 we have 
Increased the noise level to give SiN'" 1/1 and 1/4; the 
reconstructed images with the lowest four components 
clearly show The location of the 5110. These examples 
must next be extended to the regime of two dimensions; 
the convo I ut I on theorem must be app I I ed to remove 
dIstortion by the Viewing system. Other transforms can 
be used In order to apply mathematics that Is more 
"tailor-made" to the geometry of the object. FInally, we 
have obtained some grey level presentations of pIctorial 
Images by using a charge-coupled device, an optlcRAM 
wIth 128 x 256 pIxels. The grey levels In the fInal 
pICTure are obTained by comparing Images of the same 
object that were obtained with different exposure times. 
Since the cost can be as low as 3 cents/pixel, It is 
cl ear that the CCD techno! ogy 11'1 J I have a tremendous 
Impact on verification and dlgltlal Image processsing. 
IX. THE SCIENCE AND SOCIETY PUBLIC POL ICY DISKETTE 
A diskette and manual of 15 programs Is available 
from us (553 Serrano, San L u r 5 Ob I spo, CA 93401) on a 
nonprofit, noncopyrlght basis for $10. Please send us 
your resulTS for possible Inclusion on future diskettes 
so that we can create an Imformatlon network. I would 
like to thank James Hauser, Fred Jaquln, Alan Lyon, Kent 
NorvIlle, Dietrich Schroeer, and Walt WIlson for 
assistance on this project. 
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